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The full effectiveness of the EU antitrust rules (Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) requires 
that any individual can effectively claim compensation for the harm caused by an 
infringement of these rules. Damages actions based on an infringement of these rules 
complement public enforcement by allowing those who have been harmed to receive 
compensation for their harm. W hile the right to compensation is recognised by EU law, 
a range o f obstacles currently stand in the way o f injured parties effectively receiving 
the compensation to which they are entitled.
In its 2005 Green Paper on damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, the 
Commission identified difficulties in quantifying the harm suffered by injured parties as 
one of the key issues in antitrust damages actions. In its 2008 White Paper, Commission 
announced its intention to draw up a framework with pragmatic, non-binding guidance 
on quantifying the harm suffered in such actions.
In June 2011 the Commission launched a draft Guidance Paper. The main aim of it is 
to offer assistance to courts and parties involved in actions for damages by making more 
widely available information relevant for quantifying harm caused by infringements of 
the EU antitrust rules. The Guidance Paper therefore provides insights into the harm 
caused by infringements of these rules to different categories of injured parties and, 
in particular, presents the main methods and techniques currently available to quantify 
such harm.
The Guidance Paper is purely informative, does not bind national courts and does 
not alter the legal rules applicable in the Member States to damages actions based on 
infringements of Article 101 or 102 TFEU. In particular, whether any and, if so, which of 
the methods and techniques described in the Guidance Paper are considered appropriate 
to use in a given case before the courts of the Member States depends on national law 
applied in accordance with the above-mentioned EU law principles of effectiveness and 
equivalence. Relevant considerations in this respect are likely to include whether a certain 
method or technique meets the standard required under national law, whether sufficient/; 
data are available to the party charged with the burden of proof to apply the method 
or technique and whether the burden and costs involved are proportionate to the value 
of the damages claim at stake. Excessive difficulties in exercising the right to damages 
guaranteed by EU law and therefore concerns in view of the principle o f effectiveness 
could arise, for instance, through disproportionate costs or through overly demanding 
requirements regarding the degree o f certainty and precision of a quantification of 
the harm suffered. It may be that national courts, in a particular case, can use pieces of
direct evidence relevant for the quantification of harm, such as documents produced 
by an infringing undertaking in the course o f business regarding agreed price increases 
and their implementation or assessing the development of its market position. The 
availability of such evidence may play an important role when a court decides whether 
any, and if  so which, o f the methods and techniques set out below are necessary to be 
used by a party to meet the required standard of proof under applicable law.
In the followings I would like to give a short summary of this document, the most 
important part of it, and at the end to make some comments.
1. The right to compensation
Everyone who has suffered harm because of an infringement of Article 101 or 102 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has a right to be 
compensated for that harm. The Court of Justice of the EU held that this right is 
guaranteed by primary EU law Compensation means placing the injured party in the 
position it would have been in had there been no infringement. Therefore, compensation 
includes reparation not only for actual loss suffered (damnum emergens), but also for loss 
of profit (lucrum cessans) and the payment of interest. Actual loss means a reduction 
in a person’s assets; loss o f profit means that an increase in those assets, which would 
have occurred without the infringement, did not happen.
In so far as there are no EU rules governing the matter, it is for the domestic legal 
system of each Member State to lay down the detailed rules governing the exercise o f 
this right to compensation guaranteed by EU law. Such rules, however, must not render 
excessively difficult or practically impossible the exercise of rights conferred on individuals 
by EU law (principle o f effectiveness), and they must not be less favourable than those 
governing damages actions for breaches of similar rights conferred by domestic law 
(principle of equivalence).
In an action for compensation of harm suffered because o f an infringement o f 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU, national courts have to determine the amount to be awarded 
to the claimant in the event that the claim is well-founded. Assessing and proving 
the quantum of damages in actions for damages is often difficult. This is particularly 
true in competition law cases. National law -  which has to be laid down and applied 
in accordance with the rules and principles of EU law referred to in  paragraphs 1 
and 2 above -  determines the legal framework in which courts fulfil their function o f 
adjudicating disputes between parties.
Within their respective legal frameworks, legislators and courts have often adopted 
pragmatic approaches in determ ining the amount of damages to be awarded. For 
instance, they have established presumptions and allowed for the burden of proof to 
shift, e.g. once a party has provided a certain amount of facts and evidence. Also, the 
law of the Member States may provide that the illicit profit made by the infringing 
undertaking(s) plays a role —  either directly or indirectly —  in estimating the harm 
suffered by injured parties.
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2. General approach to quantifying harm in competition cases
Compensation for harm suffered aims to piacé the injured party in the position in which 
it would have been had the infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU not occurred. 
Quantification of harm suffered therefore requires the actual position of the injured 
party to be compared with the position in which this party would have been but for the 
infringement. This assessment is sometimes called ‘but-for analysis’.
The central question in antitrust damages quantification is hence to determine what 
is likely to have happened without the infringement. This hypothetical situation cannot, 
however, be observed and some form of estimation is therefore necessary to construct 
a reference scenario with which the actual situation can be compared. This reference 
scenario is referred to as the 'non-infringement scenario’ or the 'counterfactual scenario’.
The type of harm for which the claimant seeks compensation determines which 
kind of economic variables (such as, for instance, prices, sales volumes, profits, costs or 
market shares) need to be considered. For example, in a cartel leading to higher prices 
for customers of the cartelists, a non-infringement price will need to be estimated to 
have a reference point for comparing it with the price actually paid by these customers. 
In an abuse of dominance case leading to the market foreclosure o f competitors, the 
profits lost by these competitors may be measured by comparing their actual turnover and 
profit margins with the turnover and profit margins they were likely to have generated 
without the infringement.
It is impossible to know with certainty how a market would have exactly evolved in 
the absence of the infringement of Article 101 or 102 TFEU Prices, sales volumes, and 
profit margins depend on a range o f factors and complex interactions between market 
participants that are not easily estimated. Estimation of the hypothetical noninfringement 
scenario will thus by definition rely on a number o f assumptions. In practice, the 
unavailability or inaccessibility o f data will often add to this intrinsic limitation.
For these reasons, quantification o f harm in com petition cases is, by its very 
nature, subject to considerable limits as to the degree o f certainty and precision that 
can be expected. There cannot be a single ‘true’ value of the harm suffered that could 
be determined, but only best estimates relying on assumptions and approximations. 
Applicable national legal rules and their interpretation should reflect these inherent limits 
in the quantification of harm in damages actions for breaches of Articles 101 and 102 
TFEU in accordance with the EU law principle of effectiveness so that the exercise 
of the right to damages guaranteed by the Treaty is not made practically impossible;or 
excessively difficult.
The Guidance Paper outlines a number of methods and techniques that have been 
developed In economics and legal practice to establish a suitable reference scenario and 
to estimate the value of the economic variable of interest (for example, in a price cartel 
the likely price that would have been charged for the product had the infringement not 
occurred). The methods and techniques are based on different approaches and vary In 
terms of the underlying assumptions and the variety and detail o f data needed. They
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also differ in the extent to which they control for factors other than the infringement 
that may have affected the situation of the claimant. As a result, these methods and 
techniques may be more or less difficult, time-consuming and cost-intensive to apply.
Once a value for the relevant economic variable (such as, price or, for instance, 
profit margins, or sales volumes) in the hypothetical non-infringement scenario has 
been estimated, a comparison with the actual circumstances (e.g. the price actually paid 
by the injured party) is necessary to quantify the harm caused by the infringement o f 
Article 101 or 102 TFEU.
Addition of interest will also need to be considered. The award of interest, pursuant 
to the applicable national rules, is an essential component o f compensation for harm 
suffered through infringements of rights conferred by the Treaty. As the Court of Justice 
has emphasised, full compensation for the harm sustained must include the reparation 
of the adverse effects resulting from the lapse of time since the occurrence of the 
harm caused by the infringement. These effects are monetary devaluation and the lost 
opportunity for the injured party to have the capital at its disposal. National law may 
account for these effects in the form of statutory interest or other forms of interest, 
as long as they are in accordance with the above-mentioned principles of effectiveness 
and equivalence.
3. Structure of the guidance paper
The basis of a claim for damages is the submission that an infringement o f Article 101 
or 102 TFEU adversely affected the situation of the claimant. Broadly speaking, two 
principal categories of harmful effects o f such infringements can be distinguished:
(a) Infringers can exploit their market power by raising the prices their direct customers 
pay. Among the infringements having such effect are exploitative abuses within the 
meaning of Article 102 TFEU. Undertakings can also raise prices to their customers 
by engaging in the kind of practices forbidden by Article 101 TFEU. Typical examples 
are price fixing, market sharing or output limitation cartels.
Raised prices mean that the customers who purchase the affected product or service 
pay an overcharge. Moreover, a rise in prices may also lead to less demand and may entail 
a loss of profits for customers who use the product for their own commercial activities.
(b) U ndertakings can also infringe Articles 101 and 102 TFE U  by excluding 
competitors from a market or reducing their market share. Typical examples are abuses of 
a dominant position through margin squeeze, predatory pricing or tying, or certain vertical 
exclusivity agreements between suppliers and distributors that infringe competition law. 
Such practices have a significant effect on competitors, who suffer harm as they forego 
business opportunities and profit in this market. Where foreclosure o f competitors is 
successful and competitive pressure in a market diminishes, customers will be harmed 
too, typically lay a rise in prices.
Infringements of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU can also have further harmful effects, 
for example adverse impacts on product quality and innovation. The Guidance Paper
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focuses on the two principal categories of harm and the categories of injured parties. 
The methods and techniques described in the Guidance Paper may, nonetheless, also be 
relevant in damages actions concerning other types of harm and other injured parties.
Part 3 of the Guidance Paper addresses specifically the quantification of the kind 
of harm referred to in paragraph 18(a). This part includes a description of the basic 
effects on the market of price increases resulting from an infringement and illustrates 
how these types of harm (in particular the harm resulting from the payment o f an 
overcharge and the harm associated with a reduction in demand) can be quantified.
Part 4 of the Guidance Paper addresses specifically the quantification of the kind 
of harm referred to in paragraph 18(b). This part includes a description of the possible 
effects of the exclusion of competitors from a market and illustrates through examples 
how these types of harm (namely the loss of profit o f the excluded competitor and the 
harm to customers) can be quantified.
The main methods and techniques available to quantify the harm resulting from 
infringements o f Article 101 or 102 T.FEU are common to all kinds o f harm caused by 
such infringements. Part 2 of the Guidance Paper therefore provides a general overview 
of these methods and techniques. In particular, it gives more information on the basic 
assumptions on which these methods rely and explains their application in practice.
4. Methods and Techniques
The strength of all comparator-based methods lies in the fact that they use real-life data 
that are observed on the same o ra  similar market. The comparator-based methods rely 
on the premise that the comparator scenario can be considered representative of the 
likely non-infringement scenario and that the difference between the infringement data 
and the data chosen as a comparator is due to the infringement. Whether the level of 
similarity between infringement and comparator markets or time periods is considered 
sufficient in order to perform a comparison depends on national legal systems. Where 
significant differences exist between the time periods or markets considered, various 
techniques are available to account for such differences.
4.1. Methods fo r  establishing a non-infringement scenario
4.1.1. Comparison over time on the same market
One frequently used method consists in comparing the actual situation during the 
period when the infringement produced effects with the situation on the same market 
before the infringement produced effects or after they ceased. For instance, where an 
undertaking abused its dominant position by foreclosing a competitor from the market 
during 2004 and 2005, the method could look at e.g. the competitor’s profits during 
the infringement period and its profits in 2002 and 2003 when there was not yet an 
infringement. Another example would be a price fixing cartel that lasted from 2005 to
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2007 where the method could compare the price paid by the cartel customers during the 
infringement period with the price paid by customers in a period alter the infringement, 
e.g. in 2008 and 2009.
An advantage of all methods comparing, over time, data from the same geographic 
and product market is that market characteristics such as the degree of competition, 
market structure, costs and demand characteristics may be more comparable than in a 
comparison with different product or geographic markets. However, also in comparisons 
over time it happens that some differences between the two data sets are not only due to 
the infringement. In such cases, it may be appropriate to make adjustments to the data 
observed in the comparator period to account for differences with the infringement 
period or to choose a different comparator period or market. For instance, in the case 
of a long-lasting infringement, the assumption that e.g. prices of 10 years ago would 
have remained unchanged over time absent the infringement is probably overly strong 
and may lead to opting e.g. for a comparison with the pre-infringement period and the 
post-infringement period.
4.1.2. Comparison with data from other geographic markets
Another comparator-based method consists in looking at data observed in a different 
geographic market for the purpose of estimating a non-infringement scenario. These 
may be data observed across the entire geographic comparator market or data observed 
in relation to certain market participants only. The same type o f comparison can, in 
principle, be undertaken with regard to any other economic variable, e.g. the market 
shares, profit margins, rate o f return on capital, value o f assets, or level o f costs o f 
an undertaking. A comparison with the commercial performance of firms active on 
another geographic market that is unaffected by the infringement will be particularly 
relevant in cases of exclusionary behaviour.
The choice of a geographic comparator market may also be influenced by uncertainties 
about the geographic scope o f an infringement. Geographic markets on which the 
same or a similar infringement occurred are, in principle, not good candidates for 
being used as comparator markets. Also neighbouring markets on which no similar 
infringement occurred may still have been influenced by the anticompetitive practices 
on the infringement market (e.g. because prices on the neighbouring market were raised 
in view of the increased prices on the infringement market and lesser competitive 
pressure emanating from this market). A comparison with such markets will not show 
the full extent of the harm suffered, but they may, nonetheless, constitute a useful basis 
to establish a lower-bound estimate of the harm caused on the infringement market. 
This means that a party to an action for damages could, in principle, safely choose to 
rely on the comparison with a geographic market that was influenced by the same or a 
similar infringement, in particular where such influence is likely to have been rather small.
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4.1.3. Comparison with data from other product markets
Similar to the comparison across geographic markets is the approach to look at a 
different product market with similar market characteristics. For example, in a case of 
exclusionary behaviour partially foreclosing a company selling one product, the profit 
margin earned by that company in the infringement market could be compared with 
the profit margin for another product that is traded (by a similar or the same company) 
in a distinct but similar product market.
The considerations discussed in the context o f geographic comparator markets 
are, mutatás mutandis, also likely to be relevant for the choice of a suitable comparator 
product market. They will often relate to the degree of similarity between the two 
product markets. In particular, the comparator product should be carefully chosen 
with a view to the nature of the products compared, the way they are traded and the 
characteristics o f the market e.g. in terms of number of competitors, their cost structure 
and the buying power of customers. Uncertainties as to whether a potential comparator 
product market was affected by the infringement or a similar infringement of Article 
101 or 102 TFEU can also play a role.
4.1.4. Combining comparisons over time and across markets
Where sufficient data are available, it may be possible to combine comparisons over time 
and comparisons across markets. This approach is sometimes called the ‘difference in 
differences’ method because it looks at the development of the relevant economic variable 
(e.g. the price for flour) in the infringement market during a certain period (difference 
over rime on the infringement market) and compares it to the development o f the same 
variable during the same time period on an unaffected comparator market (difference 
over time on the non-infringement market). The comparison shows the difference 
between these two differences over time. This gives an estimate o f the change in the 
variable produced by the infringement and excludes all those factors that affected both 
the infringement and the comparator market in the same way. The method is thus a way 
to isolate the effects o f the infringement from other influences on the relevant variable.
A  simple example derived from the flour cartel may illustrate the method: assume 
that a before, during and after comparison reveals an increase in price o f € 40 per 
100 kg bag of flour in the Member State where the cartel occurred between 2005 and 
2008. Looking at an unaffected geographic market over the same period may show that 
prices for flour rose by € 10 per 100 kg bag due to increased costs for an input product 
(cereals). Assuming that the increased input costs also concerned the infringement 
market, a comparison of the different development of prices on the infringement and 
the comparator market would indicate the price difference caused by the flour cartel. 
In the example, this would be € 30 per unit.
The strength of the “difference in differences” method is therefore that it can subtract 
out changes unrelated to the infringement that occurred during the same time period as
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the infringement. It rests, however, to a large extent on the assumption that these other 
changes affected both markets similarly. The considerations regarding the application 
of the comparison over time and across market methods, in particular the need for 
sufficient similarity, are also relevant for the difference in differences method. From 
a practical point of view, this method usually requires a range o f data from different 
markets and periods of time that may not always be easy to obtain; lesser amounts of 
data may, however, still allow lower-bound or approximate estimates to be derived.
4.2. Implementing the method in practice: techniquesfor estimating the price or other economic variable 
in the non-infringement scenario
Once a suitable comparator-based method for establishing a non-infringement scenario 
has been chosen, various techniques are available to implement this method in practice. 
These techniques differ mainly in the degree to which they rely on individual or average 
data (e.g. price observations), and in the degree to which the data observed in the 
comparator market or period are subject to further adjustment. As a consequence, 
these techniques differ in the amount of data they require in order to be carried out.
4.2.1. Simple techniques: individual data observations, averages, interpolation and simple 
adjustments
Depending on the requirements under applicable national law and on the circumstances 
of the case, especially the degree of similarity between the infringement market and the 
comparator market or period, the data observed may be compared directly, i.e. without 
further adjustments, with the data observed in the infringement market.
The amount of data observed for the variable of interest (e.g., in the flour cartel 
example, the price for flour) in the comparator markets or comparator time periods may 
range from only one or very few data observations (i.e. the price observed in a small 
number of transactions) to a large number of data observations. In bidding markets, for 
example, auctions may occur very infrequently and at the time o f the damages estimation 
only the price observed in the one tender after the infringement may be available. A 
similar situation could occur in industries where long-term contracts are common. It 
may be appropriate to use damages estimations based on single data observations where 
these are sufficiently representative for the period of interest.
Where looking at comparator markets or time periods produces a greater liuhlber of 
data observations, e.g. the prices paid by the injured party in a series of post infringement 
transactions, or the prices paid by a number of customers in another geographic market, 
these data observations can be used either individually or in the form o f averages.
The use of various forms o f averages or other forms o f data aggregation can be 
appropriate, provided that like with like is compared. For example, where a wholesaler 
claims damages for having purchased a product in January, May, Ju ly and October 2009 
from the participants in a price cartel and where the chosen method is comparison
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with another geographic market, the monthly average prices paid in that market by the 
same type of customer (wholesaler) during the same months may be the appropriate 
reference point (i.e. comparing January data with January data, May data with May 
data, and so forth). Comparing data from the same months will, for instance, account 
for seasonal differences over a year and thus make the comparison more reliable. If, 
however, little monthly price variation exists, the average price on the comparator market 
for the entire year of 2009 may be considered an appropriate indicator. It may also be 
the case that yearly data or other average data (e.g. aggregated industry data) are simply 
the only information available. Legal systems in the Member States may generally allow 
parties to rely on average data whilst granting the defendant the opportunity to show 
that significant differences exist, and they may require the use o f more disaggregated 
data where available,
4,2.2. Regression analysis
Regression analysis uses statistical techniques to investigate patterns in the relationship 
between economic variables and to measure to what extent a certain variable o f interest 
(e.g., in the flour cartel example, the price for flour) is influenced by other variables 
that are not affected by the infringement (e.g. raw material costs, variations in customer 
demand, product characteristics, the level of market concentration). Regression analysis 
therefore makes it possible to assess whether, and by how much, factors other than the 
infringement have contributed to the difference between the value of the variable o f 
interest observed on the infringement market during the infringement period and the 
value observed in a comparator market or during a comparator time period. Regression 
analysis is thus a way to account for alternative causes for the difference between the 
compared data sets. All comparator-based methods are, in principle, capable of being 
implemented through regression analysis provided that sufficient data observations 
are available.
In a regression analysis, a number of data observations for the variable o f interest 
and the likely influencing variables are examined by means o f statistical techniques. The 
relationship identified is usually described in the form of an equation (referred to as a 
‘regression equation’ or ‘regression model’). This equation makes it possible to estimate 
the effects of influencing variables on the variable of interest and to isolate them from 
the effects of the infringement. Regression analysis estimates how closely the relevant 
variables are correlated with each other, which may in some instances be suggestive of 
a causal influence of one variable on the other.
There are two main approaches to carrying out a regression analysis for damages 
estimation, depending on whether only data from non-infringement periods (markets) 
are used to build the regression equation or whether, in addition to non-infringement 
data, also data from within the infringement period (market) are used. If only data from 
non-infringement periods are used to estimate the regression, the regression equation 
would be used to ‘forecast’ the effect on the variable of interest during the infringement
49
period on the basis of the pattern identified outside this period (‘forecasting approach’). 
Where, in addition, also data from the infringement period (market) are used to estimate 
the regression, the effect o f the infringement would be accounted for in the regression 
equation through a separate indicator variable (called ‘dummy variable’). Whether it is 
more appropriate to apply the forecasting or the dummy variable approach will depend 
on the circumstances of the case.
4.2.3. Choice o f techniques
In a given case, the choice of technique will usually depend on a range o f aspects, in 
particular the legal requirements and the factual circumstances of the case. Considerations 
relating to the standard and burden of proof are likely to be very relevant in practice.
Econometric techniques can increase the degree o f accuracy o f a damages estimate 
and may thus help in meeting a higher standard of proof if  required under applicable 
rules. Whether regression analysis is required (possibly in addition to other evidence 
available) to meet such a standard, and on which party the burden o f proof fails in this 
respect are questions of applicable law, including the EU law principle of effectiveness. 
It should be considered that carrying out an econometric analysis usually requires a 
significant number of data observations, which may not always be accessible. Moreover, 
it may also be that in a given procedural situation the applicable standard of proof does 
not require the party charged with the burden of proof to go further than the techniques 
mentioned above. This could be because the national legal system concerned considers 
the markets or periods compared as sufficiently similar and the estimate of damages 
resulting from the simple comparison as sufficiently accurate for what the party has 
to show in the given procedural situation. It may also be that the legal system, in view 
o f the damages estimation presented by a claimant and the data that are reasonably 
accessible to him, provides for a shift o f the burden o f proof from the claimant to the 
defendant. In such a situation, the defendant may consider carrying out a regression 
analysis to rebut the submission o f the claimant.
Considerations of proportionality may also play an important role, as the gathering 
of data and their econometric analysis can entail considerable costs (including those of 
third parties) that may be disproportionate to or even exceed the value o f the damages 
claim at hand. Such considerations may also become relevant with a view to the principle 
of effectiveness.
Courts in the EU have mainly used straightforward implementations o f comparator 
based methods w ithout regression analysis, often on the basis o f averages. They 
have also accepted simple adjustments to the value o f observed data when it is quite 
straightforward to identify a differentiating factor between an infringement market 
(or period) and a comparator market (or period). To date, little experience exists with 
econometric analysis in actions for antitrust damages before courts in the EU, although 
such techniques can, as described above, provide valuable help in quantifying the harm 
suffered through infringements o f Article 101 or 102 TFEU.
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Courts in the EU sometimes also apply a ‘safety discount’, i.e. they deduct from 
the observed data values an amount sufficient, under the standards o f applicable law, 
to take account of uncertainties in a damages estimate. Regression analysis can also 
be considered to account for these other possible influencing factors, and to obtain a 
“lower bound estimate” of the damages incurred.
5. Simulation models, cost-based analysis and other methods
Alongside comparator-based methods, other methods exist to establish an estimate for 
the hypothetical non-infringement situation. Such other methods include, in particular, 
the simulation of market outcomes on the basis o f economic models, and the approach 
to estimate a likely non-infringement scenario on the basis o f costs of production and 
a reasonable profit margin.
5.1. Simulation models
Simulation methods draw on economic models o f market behaviour. Economic 
studies on how markets function and how firms compete with each other have shown 
that markets with certain characteristics may allow the likely outcomes o f market 
interaction to be predicted, for instance the likely price or production levels or profit 
margins. The branch of economics known as industrial organisation has developed 
models of competition for various types of markets that can simulate such outcomes. 
These models range from monopoly models to, at the other end o f the spectrum, 
perfect competition models. Intermediate models designed to reflect firm behaviour 
in oligopolistic markets are, in particular, those designed originally in the 19th century 
by the economists Augustin Cournot and Joseph Bertrand and numerous extensions 
and variations of the Cournot and Bertrand models. These include, in particular, also 
dynamic oligopoly models based on game theory that take into account the repeated 
interaction between firms in the market.
Prices are likely to be highest (and sales volumes lowest) in a monopoly and prices 
are likely to be lowest (and sales volumes highest) in a situation o f perfect competition. 
The particular oligopolies described by Bertrand (‘Bertrand oligopoly’) in markets with 
differentiated goods and by Cournot (‘Cournot oligopoly’) will normally lead to prices 
and volumes somewhere between perfect competition and monopoly levels; the exact 
outcome depends on the number o f firms in the market and barriers to entry, on the 
degree of differentiation between them and their products and on other characteristics 
of the market at hand, such as demand characteristics (especially, how sensitive customers 
are to changes in price), and the capacities and cost structure o f producers.
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5.2. Cost-based method
Another approach to estimating the likely prices that would have emerged absent the 
infringement is provided by the cost-based method. This method consists in using some 
measure of production costs per unit, and adding a mark-up for a profit that would 
have been ‘reasonable’ in the non-infringement scenario. The resulting estimate for a 
per unit non-infringement price can be compared to the per unit price actually charged 
by the infringing undertaking(s) to obtain an estimate of the overcharge.
Different types of production costs may be suitable for implementing the cost-based 
method, depending on the characteristics o f the industry concerned. It is, however, 
essential to ensure that the treatment o f costs and margins is consistent. For example, 
if  variable costs (i.e. costs that vary with the level of production) are considered as the 
basis of this exercise, a gross margin (i.e. the margin earned once variable costs have 
been deducted) should be added to calculate the price. It should also be noted that the 
relevant cost for determining prices may be not only the cost of the infringer, but also 
the cost of one of its competitors (e.g. if  the price in the market is determined by the 
least efficient producer).
53. Other methods
The methods described in this Guidance Paper are those that have received most 
consideration so far in legal practice and academic scholarship. They should, however, 
not be seen as an exhaustive list, firstly, as the methods described could further evolve 
or others could be developed in practice.
Secondly, there are methods not discussed in this Guidance Paper could nonetheless 
prove useful, in particular, in order to establish an upper- or lower-bound or approximate 
estim atel09 for the harm suffered. Especially where the legal systems provide for the 
possibility o f an approximate estimation, national courts have opted for pragmatic 
techniques rather than a sophisticated implementation of the methods set out in Sections 
A and B above to establish the amount o f damages to be awarded to injured parties. For 
instance, in cases where a new entrant has been foreclosed in breach o f Article 101 or 
102 TFEU, business plans have sometimes been used as a source o f information on the 
likely profits of a business, albeit in some instances adjusted depending on the market 
circumstances or through the use of data from a comparator market or undertaking.
It is for national courts to establish whether, under the applicable rules, a method can 
be accepted for the quantification of harm in a given case, provided that the principles 
of effectiveness and equivalence o f EU law are observed.
6. Choice of methods
Each of the methods can, in principle, provide useful insights in relation to all infringements 
o f Article 101 or 102 TFEU and the different types o f harm such infringements tend to 
produce. In particular, they make it possible to estimate not only the amount of illegal
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price overcharge in a price fixing cartel but also, for example, the sales volume or the 
profit lost by a company suffering harm through an exclusionary abuse by a dominant 
competitor.
It should be stressed that it is only possible to estimate, not to measure with certainty 
and precision, what the hypothetical non-infringement scenario is likely to have looked 
like. There is no method that could be singled out as the one that would in all cases 
be more appropriate than others. Each o f the methods described above has particular 
features, strengths and weaknesses that may make it more or less suitable to estimate 
the harm suffered in a given set o f circumstances. In particular, the methods differ 
in the degree to which they are simple to apply, in the degree to which they rely on 
data that are the outcome of actual market interactions or on assumptions based on 
economic theory and in the extent to which they take into account factors other than 
the infringement that may have affected the situation of the parties.
In the specific circumstances o f any given case, the appropriate approach to 
quantification must be determined under the applicable rules of law. Relevant considerations 
may include, alongside the standard and burden of proof under applicable legal rules, 
the availability of data, the costs and time involved and their proportionality in relation 
to the value of the damages claim at stake. The costs to be considered in this context 
may not only be those incurred when the party bearing the burden of proof applies 
the method, but also include the costs for the other party to rebut its submissions and 
the costs to the judicial system when the court assesses the results produced by the 
method, possibly with the help of a court-appointed expert. The costs and burden for 
an injured party and their proportionality may become particularly relevant with a view 
to the principle of effectiveness. Moreover, the decision under applicable law as to 
whether and, if  so, which of the methods and techniques described in this Guidance 
Paper should be used may also depend on the availability of other evidence, for instance 
documentary evidence produced by the undertakings on the course of business showing 
that an illegally agreed price increase was actually implemented at a certain amount.
It may be that in a given case the application of several methods (e.g. comparison 
over time and comparison across geographic markets) is envisaged, either alternatively 
or cumulatively. Where two different methods yield results that are similar, such findings 
may lead a legal system to attribute stronger evidentiary value to the damages estimate, 
possibly a lower bound, based on these methods. Where, however, the application of 
two methods produces apparently contradictory results (especially when two opposing 
parties each rely on a different method), it is normally not appropriate either to simply' 
take the average of the two results nor would it be appropriate to consider that the 
contradictory results cancel each other out in the sense that both methods should be 
disregarded. In such a scenario it would rather be appropriate to examine the reasons 
for the diverging results and to carefully consider the strengths and weaknesses of each 
method and its implementation in the case at hand.
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7. Remarks
Tt is not an easy task to understand this Guidance Paper immediately, however, it 
contains a lot of useful information and tools for practising lawyers. Probably the 
main problem is that the rules of the EU competition law are too wide and not clear 
enough. If we have a look at the Hungarian Act LVII of 1996 on the Prohibition of 
Unfair Trading Practices and Unfair Competition, we can find the rule of the 10% 
presumption. According to 88/C. § in lawsuits instituted for the enforcement of any civil 
claim against any person alleged to be an accomplice in any agreements and concerted 
practices between companies in violation of Section 11 of this Act or Article 81 o f the 
EC Treaty aiming, directly or indirectly, for the fixing of prices, to secure a dominant 
position in the market, or for establishing production or sales quotas, for the purpose 
o f determining the impact of the infringement on the price charged by the infringer, 
it shall be treated - until proven otherwise - that the infringement distorted the price to 
the extent o f ten per cent.
This Hungarian rule makes the decisions on quantifying harm in actions for damages 
based on breaches of Art, 101 or 102 TFEU much easier, and could be a good example 
for other national or even for EU legislation. In this case such complicated Guidance 
Paper would not be necessary.
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